

Urbanization in China:
Discussion of Chauvin, Glaeser, Ma, Tobio
(2017) and Henderson report (2009)

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JUE: Urbanization in Developing Countries

Special Issue (March 2017) emphasized that while in the past countries urbanized as they became wealthier, today countries with fairly low per-capita income still have high urbanization rates (China is a different case)

Given that much of urban economics theory and research is based on European and North American urbanization, important question is how well research applies to developing world (different income levels, different political structures, different era, and technology, of urbanization)

Published five papers on China looking at political favoritism in capital market, effect of high speed rail, housing demand, enforcement of building height restrictions, and general spatial patterns

Chauvin, Glaeser, Ma, Tobio, JUE 2016

Chauvin, Glaeser, Ma, Tobio (CGMT) note that most empirical work in urban economics has focused on the US

Urban empirical work in other countries beside US focused on developed countries (mostly Europe)


General question of CGMT: do all the spatial patterns documented in developed countries hold for developing nations?

Examine US, Brazil, India, and China

Specifically look at 1) Zipf's Law 2) Spatial Equilibrium evidence 3) Agglomeration Externalities evidence

Urbanization in CGMT Countries

Figure 1: Share of total population living in urban areas, 1960-2014



Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank.

What can we learn from this paper?

CGMT is a good paper for our class:

1. Good overall discussion of important empirical patterns in Urban Economics
2. Shows basic methods for documenting these patterns
3. Shows required data for China
4. Further, offers some evidence that China differs from US—possible ideas for future research

Quick Intro: What is Zipf's Law?

Zipf's Law for Cities, or the rank-size rule, is an empirical relationship between the population rank and population size of cities in a country (Gabaix 1999)

Specifically, the rank (1 is highest) follows a power-law such that $Rank = a * Pop^{-\zeta}$, or in logs:

$$\ln(Rank) = \ln(a) - \zeta \ln(Pop) \quad (1)$$

Zipf's Law for Cities states that $\zeta = 1$


Implies that population of 2nd is half pop of 1st, 3rd is 1/3 pop of 1st, 4th is 1/4...

Another way to think of this is that cities in a country are random draws from the following distribution:

$$Pr(\text{Population} > x) = a/x^\zeta \quad (2)$$

Zipf's Law in US: Gabaix 2016

A Plot of City Rank versus Size for all US Cities with Population over 250,000 in 2010




Source: Author, using data from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (2012).

Notes: The dots plot the empirical data. The line is a power law fit ($R^2 = 0.98$), regressing $\ln Rank$ on $\ln Size$. The slope is -1.03 , close to the ideal Zipf's law, which would have a slope of -1 .

Zipf's Law in UK: Gabaix 2016

Density Function of City Sizes (Agglomerations) for the United Kingdom



Source: Rozenfeld et al. (2011).

Notes: We see a pretty good power law fit starting at about 500 inhabitants. The Pareto exponent is actually statistically non-different from 1 for size $S > 12,000$ inhabitants.

Why is this important?

This empirical relationship is so strong $R^2 \sim 1$ some economists (Gabaix) propose that any system of cities model which tries to explain the data must lead to this regularity

For example, one of the classic models for cities (Henderson, 1974) does not lead to Zipf's distributions

Gabaix JEP 2016 considers this one of the few “non-trivial and true” results of economics

What explains Zipf's Law?

Many economic models try to explain this finding

Gabaix (1999) shows that models with random growth will lead (mathematically) to Zipf's Law

Gibrat's Law: growth rate of population does not depend upon initial population

Contribution of Gabaix QJE 1999 is to show Gibrat's Law implies Zipf's Law (power law with coeff of 1)

Ongoing Line of Research

Zipf's Law continues to be extensively studied

Some discussion over exact form (power law vs log normal distribution, see Eeckhout 2004)

Much work on cross-country comparisons, including this paper

Additional work on how to define a city (Rozenfeld, Rybski, Gabaix, Makse, AER 2011)

How universal is Zipf's Law—does it hold among small geographies? (Holmes and Lee, 2010)

Lee and Li (JUE 2013) show that Zipf's Law can result from product of multiple random factors

Implies that cannot use Zipf's Law to test system of cities models since even if a single model does not yield Zipf's Law it may when combined with other models (and we do not usually assume our models are exhaustive)

Back to CGMT: Zipf's Law

CGMT look for evidence of Zipf's Law and Gibrat's Law in country sample


Focus is on simplest methodologies and use of data comparable across countries

Test Zipf's Law with standard regression of $\log(\text{Rank})$ on $\log(\text{Pop})$

Test Gibrat's Law by regressing population growth on initial population

Zipf's Law, CGMT

Figure 2: Zipf's Law. Urban populations and urban population ranks, 2010



Note: Regression specifications and standard errors based on Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011). Samples restricted to areas with urban population of 100,000 or larger.

Sources: See data appendix.

Zipf Law Results

US has coefficient close to -1, consistent with past findings

In Brazil, fit is linear but slope is -1.18—steeper than Zipf's Law

China has very non-linear shape—does not fit straight line Zipf's pattern

China has too *few* large cities to be consistent with Zipf's Law

India is also somewhat curved but closer to US fit

Authors also do KS test on distributions, find China's distribution particularly distinct from other three countries

Gibrat's Law Regressions

Table 4: Gibrat's Law: Urban population growth and initial urban population

	USA (MSAs)	Brazil (Microregions)	China (Cities)	India (Districts)
1980 - 2010	0.009 (0.020) N=217 R2=0.001	-0.038 (0.023) N = 144 R2 = 0.015	-0.447*** (0.053) N=187 R2=0.280	-0.052** (0.023) N=237 R2=0.021
1980 - 1990	0.008 (0.008) N=217 R2=0.004	-0.026** (0.013) N = 144 R2 = 0.020	-0.310*** (0.054) N=187 R2=0.151	0.063* (0.034) N=237 R2=0.015
1990 - 2000	0.014** (0.007) N=217 R2=0.019	0.001 (0.010) N = 144 R2 = 0.000	-0.308*** (0.036) N=187 R2=0.280	0.005 (0.020) N=237 R2=0.00
2000 - 2010	0.012** (0.006) N=217 R2=0.018	0.006 (0.006) N = 144 R2 = 0.006	0.019 (0.021) N=187 R2=0.005	-0.013 (0.015) N=237 R2=0.004

Note: All figures reported correspond to area-level regressions of the log change in urban population on the log of initial urban populations in the specified period. Regression restricted to areas with urban population of 100,000 or more in 1980. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: See data appendix.

Discussion of Zipf and Gibrat Results

US and Brazil fit well but India doesn't and China is large outlier

China data also not consistent with Gibrat's Law; shows mean reversion, smaller cities grow faster

Authors suggest China may still be far from steady state spatial equilibrium

Further suggest that government role in migration could alter market-based city distribution

Note that possible in long-run "China's urban populations will be much more skewed towards ultra large areas like Beijing and Shanghai."


Testing Spatial Equilibrium Hypothesis

Spatial equilibrium hypothesis: migration causes wages and local prices to adjust across locations so that workers of same ability have equal utility in all locations (no spatial arbitrage in equilibrium)

CGMT test this idea by asking:

1. Do costs of living rise with wages?
2. Are real wages (wages - housing costs) lower in places with better climates (amenities)?
3. Is *happiness* higher in places with higher income? Way to test equalization of utility
4. How much within-migration is in each country?

Rosen-Roback Model: Consumer Amenity Only



Prices and Wages: Cobb-Douglas

Say people have utility $U = A * H^\alpha C^{1-\alpha}$ and after-tax wages $(1 - t) * W$

Then indirect utility function, with constant K , is

$$V = K * A * (1 - t)W * P_H^{-\alpha}$$

Take logs and re-arrange:

$$\ln(P_H) = \frac{1}{\alpha} (\ln(K/V) + \ln((1 - t) * W) + \ln(A)), \text{ or:}$$

$$\text{Log}(HPrice_i) = \frac{1}{\alpha} (\text{Constant} + \text{Log}(Wage_i) + \text{Log}(Amenities_i)) \quad (1)$$

Then $\partial E[\text{Log}(HPrice_i)|X]/\partial \text{Log}(Wage_i) =$

$$\frac{1}{\alpha} \left(1 + \frac{\text{Cov}(\text{Log}(wage), \text{Log}(Amenities))}{\text{Var}(\text{Log}(Wage))} \right)$$

If $\text{Cov}(\text{Log}(wage), \text{Log}(Amenities)) = 0$ then coeff = $1/\alpha$; US households spend $\alpha = 1/3$ of income on housing so coeff = 3 (China's $\alpha = 1/10$)

Prices and Wages: Linear Form

Alternatively, assume perfectly inelastic housing demand with each person consuming $H=1$

Then numeraire consumption is $C = (1 - t)W - P_H + A$, where A is additive for convenience

Then we have $P_H = (1 - t)W + A - C$, or:

$$HPrice_i = AfterTxW_i + Amenities_i \quad (2)$$

Then $E[HPrice_i | Wage_i] = 1 - t + \frac{Cov(Wage, Amenities)}{Var(Wage)}$

If $Cov(Wage, Amenities) = 0$ then $coeff = 1 - t$

Wages and Rents Regressions

Table 5: Regressions of housing rents on wages, 2010

	USA (MSAs)	Brazil (Microregions)	China (Cities)	India (Districts)
	Log of rents	Log of rents	Log of rents	Log of rents
Average log wage	1.225*** (0.106) N = 29M R2 =0.208	1.011*** (0.044) N = 819 K R2 = 0.560	1.122 *** (0.073) N = 24.5K R2 = 0.521	-0.044 (0.052) N=1,484 R2=0.304
Average log wage residual in region	1.612*** (0.159) N = 29M R2 = 0.202	1.367*** (0.076) N = 819 K R2 = 0.552	1.097 *** (0.122) N = 24.8K R2 = 0.515	-0.019 (0.060) N=1,484 R2=0.304
Dwelling characteristics controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Regressions at the urban household level, restricted to areas with urban population of 100,000 or more.


Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: See data appendix.

Wages and Rents Plots

Figure 3: Income and rents, 2010



Note: Samples restricted to areas with urban population of 100,000 or more.

Sources: See data appendix.

Discussion of Wages and Rents

Coeff in US is far below 3; suggests
 $Cov(Wages, Amenities) < 0$, rent data is poor measure of housing costs, or unobserved human capital much higher in high wage cities—why?

Spatial equilibrium only holds for workers of same skill level—more productive workers should earn higher wages compared to less productive workers in same location

Fit for China much worse ($R^2 = 0.07$), coeff about 1, why?

CGMT list possibilities: 1) strong negative correlation between wages and amenities 2) hukou system 3) differences in housing market counteract equilibrium effects (small rental market, significant government intervention in housing policy)

Real Wages and Amenities

Areas with positive amenities should have lower real wages (nominal wage/house price), why?

CGMT uses January+July temperature and rainfall to measure amenities

Regress $\ln(W_i) - \ln(PH_i)$ or $W_i - PH_i$ on these weather amenities

Real Wages and Amenities: US, Brazil

Table 6: Climate amenities regressions, 2010

	USA (MSAs)			Brazil (Microregions)		
	Log wage	Log real wage	Log rent	Log wage	Log real wage	Log rent
Absolute difference from ideal temperature in the summer (Celsius)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.077*** (0.006)	-0.042*** (0.003)	-0.095*** (0.010)
Absolute difference from ideal temperature in the winter (Celsius)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.016 (0.012)
Average annual rainfall (mm/month)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.005*** (0.001)
Education groups controls	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Age groups controls	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Dwelling characteristics controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Observations (thousands)	28,237	8,497	24,125	2,172	2,172	819
Adjusted R-squared	0.249	0.158	0.117	0.340	0.317	0.480

Real Wages and Amenities: China, India

	China (Cities)			India (Districts)		
	Log wage	Log real wage	Log rent	Log wage	Log real wage	Log rent
Absolute difference from ideal temperature in the summer (Celsius)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.021)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.001 (0.001)
Absolute difference from ideal temperature in the winter (Celsius)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)
Average annual rainfall (mm/month)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Education groups controls	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Age groups controls	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Dwelling characteristics controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Observations (thousands)	5.8	4.2	3.4	8.4	1.8	2.9
Adjusted R-squared	0.145	0.118	0.079	0.235	0.228	0.762

Note: Regressions at the individual level, restricted to urban prime-age males or urban household level (renters only) in areas with urban population of 100,000 or more. All regressions include a constant.

Discussion: Real Wages and Amenities

In US, real wages are higher where climate is worse, consistent with high amenities low real wage idea

Authors argue this is due to low rents in places with less attractive climates (column 3); find no effect on nominal wage

China and India show no relationship—any ideas why?

Using Happiness to Evaluate Equal Utility

If equal utility holds then happiness should be (roughly) equal across regions

Authors note that interpreting happiness differences across locations is difficult: heterogeneity could be due to heterogeneity in sampled individuals (ex: different ethnic groups or sorting)


Instead they check if happiness changes with income; spatial equilibrium says should be no relationship—why?

Find that US has slight positive coefficient (happiness on income); China has large positive coefficient, just barely significant

Speculate China relationship due to either 1) unobserved human capital higher in richer places 2) happiness reflects amenities 3) spatial equilibrium doesn't hold due to migration barriers (ex: hukou)


Happiness and Wages: US

Figure 4: Happiness and income levels
USA




Happiness and Wages: China, India

China



Regression: Happiness=-4.3(02.972)+0.54(0.373)·Log Disposable Income (R2=0.04)

India



Regression: Happiness=-2.44(01.73)+0.24(0.176)·Log Mean Per Capita Income (R2=0.01)

Measuring Mobility

Spatial equilibrium model does not require people to move; housing prices can adjust to reach equilibrium

However, if there *is* limited mobility then spatial equilibrium may not hold

CGMT look at migration in 4 countries, find significant mobility in China

Use China Census data (county-level), look at “migrants in last 5 yrs”

Conclude that Chinese mobility comparable to US mobility, high enough to allow spatial equilibrium

Migration and Mobility

Table 7: Percentage of the population living in a different locality five years ago

	USA			Brazil		
	1990	2000	2010	1991	2000	2010
Migrants in the last 5 years (% of population)	21.3%	21.0%	13.8%	9.5%	9.1%	7.1%
From same state/prov., different county / dist.	9.7%	9.7%	6.7%	6.0%	5.4%	4.5%
From different state/province	9.4%	8.4%	5.6%	3.5%	3.6%	2.4%
From abroad	2.2%	2.9%	1.5%	0.04%	0.1%	0.14%
	China			India		
	2000	2010	1993	2001	2011	
Migrants in the last 5 years (% of population)	6.3%	12.8%	1.9%	2.6%	2.0%	
From same state/prov., different county / dist.	2.9%	6.4%	1.3%	1.5%	1.2%	
From different state/province	3.4%	6.4%	0.6%	1.0%	0.8%	
From abroad	N/A	N/A	0.02%	0.1%	0.03%	

Sources: See data appendix.

Productivity in Big Cities: Agglomeration Externalities

One of the most fundamental ideas in urban economics is that concentrating workers leads to higher productivity

Without such a force, the only way to explain the existence of cities is through heterogeneity in land productivity (very hard story to justify Beijing/Shanghai)

Extensive and deep empirical work in urban economics documents agglomeration externalities, simplest form regresses log wage on log population (Melo et. al. 2009 meta analysis suggests elasticity of 0.02-0.1)

Lots of recent work on agglomeration benefits of concentrating high skilled workers (ex: Moretti papers)

Estimating Agglomeration Externalities in CGMT

Two issues with $\log(\text{wage}) \sim \log(\text{pop})$ regressions: 1) unobserved productivity 2) sorting

Some cities may be more naturally productive, which causes in-migration and increases wages (omitted variable bias at city level)

It's also possible that unobservably skilled people sort into larger cities

Difficult identification but usually addressed by instrumenting population with historical values and trying to control for sorting with education covariates

Quite a few papers find estimates of agglomeration externalities for China significantly larger than in US, but definition of cities always a measurement issue

Agglomeration Externalities

Table 9: Real income and agglomeration, 2010

	USA (MSAs)	Brazil (Microregions)	China (Cities)	India (Districts)
	Log real wage	Log real wage	Log real wage	Log real wage
OLS regressions				
Log of urban population	0.0190** (0.00916)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.0313 (0.0307)	0.0688** (0.0298)
	R2= 0.067	R2=0.310	R=0.174	R2=0.240
Log of density	0.0219 (0.0134)	0.002 (0.007)	0.0516** (0.0166)	0.0691*** (0.0213)
	R2=0.068	R2=0.309	R2=0.179	R2=0.244
Observations	28.5M	2,172 K	147K	2,102
IV1 regressions				
Log of urban population	0.0209** (0.0102)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.0664 (0.0485)	0.116 (0.0927)
	R2=0.068	R2 = 0.310	R2=0.174	R2=0.243
Log of density	0.0230* (0.0134)	0.001 (0.007)	0.0345* (0.0175)	0.0647** (0.0255)
	R2=0.068	R2 = 0.309	R2=0.179	R2=0.241
Observations	28.5M	2,172 K	143K	1,649
IV2 regressions				
Log of urban population	0.0466** (0.0190)	-0.017 (0.016)	0.0648 (0.0743)	0.208** (0.0840)
	R2=0.065	R2 = 0.305	R2=0.161	R2=0.244
Log of density	0.0419** (0.0163)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.0665 (0.0625)	0.0512* (0.0263)
	R2=0.067	R2 = 0.307	R2=0.179	R2=0.241
Observations	28.5M	1,998 K	112K	1,141
Educational attainment controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Regressions at the individual level, restricted to urban prime-age males in areas with urban population of 100,000 or more. All regressions include a constant.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: See data appendix.

Agglomeration and Human Capital

Authors discuss a series of regressions of education and wages

One notable finding: regressions on human capital return show very high coefficients in China

Regress individual wage on indiv. characteristics and area education levels, instrumenting with predicted education levels (use age structure)

A ten percent increase in share of adults with college education in a city leads to sixty percent increase in earnings

Human Capital Externalities

Table 10: Human capital externalities, 2010

	USA (MSAs)		Brazil (Microregions)		China (Cities)		India (Districts)	
	Log wage	Log wage	Log wage	Log wage	Log wage	Log wage	Log wage	Log wage
OLS regressions								
Share of Adult population with BA	1.272*** (0.155)	1.001*** (0.200)	3.616*** (0.269)	4.719*** (0.440)	6.743*** (1.088)	5.262*** (0.862)	3.215*** (0.851)	1.938** (0.841)
Log of density		0.0241*** (0.00746)		-0.029*** (0.008)		0.112*** (0.0199)		0.0542*** (0.0169)
R-squared	0.26	0.255	0.342	0.346	0.120	0.139	0.256	0.255
Observations (thousands)	34M	27M	2,172 K	2,1712 K	147K	147K	12K	12K
IV1 regressions								
Share of Adult population with BA	1.237*** (0.202)	1.126*** (0.231)	2.985*** (0.332)	3.784*** (0.486)	6.572*** (0.925)		2.911*** (0.988)	2.124** (1.074)
Log of density		0.0216*** (0.00769)		-0.018** (0.009)				0.0425** (0.0178)
R-squared	0.254	0.255	0.341	0.344	0.120		0.240	0.243
Observations	27M	27M	2,172K	2,172 K	147K		11 K	11K
IV2 regressions								
Share of Adult population with BA	1.594*** (0.380)	0.956** (0.396)	4.166*** (1.059)	6.705*** (1.756)	7.189*** (1.437)		8.126** (3.458)	7.989 (5.521)
Log of density		0.00654 (0.0155)		-0.052** (0.023)				-0.0107 (0.0615)
R-squared	0.228	0.232	0.341	0.341	0.120		0.206	0.212
Observations (thousands)	17M	16M	2,172 K	2,172 K	147K		10 K	10 K
Educational attainment controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes


Note: Regressions at the individual level, restricted to urban prime-age males in areas with urban population of 100,000 or more. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: See data appendix.

Education and Growth

Figure 5: University graduates share and population growth 1980-2010



Note: Samples restricted to areas with total population of 100,000 or more in 1980.

Sources: See data appendix.

CGMT Concluding Thoughts

1. US and Brazil follow Zipf; China and India have too few large cities
2. Relationship between income and rents similar in US, Brazil, and China; not India
3. Generally, spatial equilibrium not as strong a fit in China as US and Brazil; authors suggest this might reflect hukou system
4. Connection between human capital and area success (growth) higher in Brazil, China, India compared to US
5. Overall, suggest spatial equilibrium model appropriate for Brazil, China, US, but not India

Background of Report

Prof. Henderson asked to prepare report for China Economic Research and Advisory Programme (think tank)

Henderson put together a document (Nov 2009) detailing general urban economics knowledge, assessment of urbanization in China, policy recommendations

Data used ends in early 2000's; nonetheless, many topics and suggestions seem very relevant today

Recommendations and issues influenced 2014 joint report by World Bank and China Development Research Center

Ideas seem to have been incorporated into March 2014 “National New-Type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020)” from Central Committee of Communist Party

Why Useful to our Class?

Highly relevant setting (for us—economists in China) to show application of urban economics theory, both in empirical evidence and policy

Great place to find ideas for research papers on urban economics in China

Pay attention to:

1. What are the main forces (ex: migration, agglomeration) discussed in Chinese urbanization? What forces are missing?
2. Empiricists: what data is being used for empirical evidence? What opportunities are there for better measurement?
3. Theorists: what are main policy instruments being suggested? Consistent with Chinese setting? Can you think of better mechanisms?

Cities in Development

Urbanization important driver of growth

1. Productivity is higher in cities
2. Virtuous cycle: increasing city population may lead to further productivity increases
3. Agglomeration: learning, matching, sharing; empirical evidence that doubling of individual industry scale leads to 2-10% growth in productivity
4. Cities have “knowledge accumulation”—part of learning mechanism in Duranton and Puga

City production hierarchies

General patterns in urban specialization as countries develop

Suggests both:

- 1) greater production specialization across cities with development
- 2) bigger cities will have more diversified production

What model would lead to this type of hierarchy?

Inequality and Favored Cities

Many urbanizing countries go through period of growing rural-urban inequality

Large urban-rural income gap declines with modernization (no gap in South Korea, Taiwan urban-rural wage ratio declined to 1.4)

Common problem in urbanization across countries: policy adjusts more slowly than labor market integration (migration), governments tend to excessively favor large cities in capital markets and fiscal allocation

Favoritism leads to “mega-cities” with too many people and smaller cities with too few

Urban management lags population growth, resulting in excessive negative externalities (pollution, congestion, food/building safety, crime)

Urban-rural inequality: international experience





Figure 1. Urban-rural inequality by degree of urbanization. WDR (World Bank, 2009)

Urbanization in China: Urban-rural gap


1. Slower urbanization rate: Chinese urban population growth 3.5%, more typical is 5-6% for urbanizing country. Level of urbanization is lower than other countries with similar per-capita GDP (46% as of article, 53% now)
2. Agricultural sector inefficient: many, small, unproductive farms, excess labor
3. Growing urban-rural income gap: suggests that hukou system slows urban-rural mobility, leading to higher inequality
4. Too many low-population cities: much urbanization results from rural to urban migration *within* same prefecture, perhaps as result of hukou system. Most countries have more long-distance migration, leading to more efficient allocation

Asian Countries: urban-rural inequality

Philippines, 2000



China 1999&2006



India, 1983 & 1994




Figure 2. Within country urban-rural differences by regional degree of urbanization
WDR (World Bank, 2009)

China: too few middle-sized cities




Figure 3. Share in Urban Population of Each City Size Category: World vs. China, 2000. Covers metropolitan areas over 100,000. China's Census numbers are courtesy of Du Yang of CASS.

Urbanization in China: Industry Concentration

1. “Urban hierarchy”: excessive favoritism of top cities (think tiering system, which is unique to China). From 2002-2007 fixed asset investment (per-capita) was 4-5 times higher in top 30 cities than county cities, despite smaller cities having more manufacturing intensity (which requires larger fixed investment than services)
2. Insufficient industry concentration and specialization: suggests overly diversified cities is a legacy of planning system. Economic growth would increase with more specialization (more productive industries in fewer locations)
3. Poor living conditions of migrant workers: lack access to city services, face discrimination, lower wages and exploitation.
4. Notes that children of migrant workers now allowed to go to city schools—generally true but not in biggest cities

Urbanization in China: Gov't Expenditure

Government resource allocation heavily weighted to top cities

Suggests this is not entirely driven by rate of return; could improve efficiency by redistributing to smaller cities

Note: more in depth discussion in forthcoming Chen and Henderson, JUE 2016

	Total FDI (US\$) per capita (hukou population): 2002-2007	Total investment in fixed assets (¥) per capita: 2002-2007	Share of second sector in GDP 2007
Provincial level cities (4)	3850	122,500	42%
Provincial capital (26)	2060	98,900	44%
Other prefecture level cities (238)	1570	64,000	56%
County-level cities (367)	980	24,400	54%

Table 2. Where capital investment goes. Urban Year Books (China: Data Online). Numbers for prefecture and above level cities are for urban districts.

Suggested Policy

Two main ideas:

- 1) “Unification” of land, labor, and capital markets: strengthening property rights, relaxing barriers to migration, removing political allocations of resources and barriers to resource flow
- 2) Changing administrative structure: suggests decentralizing government so that local policy-makers can better respond to local conditions

Remove Migration Barriers

Mainly interested in encouraging flow of “surplus” rural labor to more productive cities

Suggests further relaxation of hukou policy but worried migrants will mainly flow to mega-cities (top tier)

One policy: allow free migration *within* province but not across provinces

Eventually must allow free migration across provinces; as smaller cities improve may take pressure off top tier

Combining system of cities model with spatial equilibrium condition (Roback-Rosen)

Migrant Conditions

Improving mobility should have large benefits but brings issues:

1. How to support elderly left back in country-side?
2. Should provide aid to migrants in cities but do not want to subsidize migration: will encourage inefficient migration to cities with subsidies (welfare abuse argument)
3. Allow migrants to easily sell rural assets
4. Improve housing rental market: remove tax on rental income (interesting!)

Land Sales, Property Rights, Taxes

Argues local governments rely on land sales for revenue

Acquire land from rural residents at lower than market value, may sell to developers below market price

Strengthening rural property rights could encourage better use

Suggests local governments should raise revenue through property and sales taxes (VAT)

Land Usage and Zoning

Argues China does not have strong zoning laws or generally zoning plans

Exacerbates usage problems (ex: polluting industries next to residents)

Comment: zoning seems like an interesting and unexplored topic

Further, new development often far from CBD, encourages inefficient car use

Note: this article was written before implementation of congestion policies in top tier cities (odd-even, license plate auctions, other driving restrictions, gas price floor)

Main Issues Central to Urban Economics

1. Agglomeration increases productivity: unrealized agglomeration gains in China
2. Urban cost: however, population pressure already leading to high urban costs in top tier cities
3. Barriers to migration prevent spatial equilibrium: cities could be more productive, inequality across locations too high
4. Transportation costs key to spatial distribution; smart policies can limit sprawl
5. Advocating property taxes to redistribute urbanization gains

What's missing?

What big issues were not covered?

Housing: a bit of discussion of rental market but generally light emphasis on housing issues

Chinese housing policies seem like a good topic for research

Greater detail on urban cost: pollution much more relevant now than in 2009

Research Questions

Ideas?

1. Measuring sector specialization and urban diversity in Chinese cities
2. Quantifying agglomeration economies in China
3. Policy simulations on migration flows
4. Quantifying knowledge accumulation in Chinese cities
5. Understanding zoning—creating of Chinese regulatory index (like WRI)
6. Recommended tax policy

2014 National Urbanization Plan

Quoting from Xinhua English press release:

- “proportion of permanent urban residents to China’s total population stands at 53.7 percent, lower than developed nations’ average of 80 percent, and 60 percent for developing countries with similar per capita income levels as China”
- “An increasing urbanization ratio will help raise the income of rural residents through employment in cities and unleash the consumption potential”
- “will also bring about large demands for investment in urban infrastructure, public service facilities and housing construction, thus providing continuous impetus for economic development”

2014 National Urbanization Plan

Quoting from Xinhua English press release:

- “Other principles set by the plan include coordinating urban and rural development, optimizing macro-level city layouts and integrating ecological civilization into the entire urbanization process”
- “China will also optimize city layouts by enhancing the leading role of major cities, increasing the number of small and medium-sized cities and improving the service functions of small towns, the plan showed.”
- “By 2020, China’s ratio of permanent urban residents to total population should reach about 60 percent, while residents with city hukou should account for about 45 percent of total population”